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Regulation and Adaptation of Management Accounting Innovations: 
The Case of Economic Value Added in Thai State-Owned Enterprises 
 
Abstract 
Research on the diffusion of management accounting innovations (MAIs) has grown into a 
substantial literature which draws attention to how diffusion processes can be fuelled by 
compulsory regulation. However, relatively little is known about how MAIs interact with 
wider regulatory processes in society and how this affects the adaptation of such innovations 
as they diffuse across organisations. This paper extends research on this topic by addressing 
the questions of how regulators mediate the adaptation of MAIs and how this mediation 
affects the use of such innovations across regulatees. We explore these questions in relation 
to the evolution of Economic Value Added (EVATM) as a compulsory performance 
management system for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Thailand. Theoretically, we 
extend research on management innovations with sociological research, which sees 
regulation as an evolving and collaborative process that unfolds as an integral part of broader, 
societal reform programmes. Consistent with this perspective, we show how regulators can 
fill a key role as mediators by engaging in ongoing consultations with the suppliers of MAIs 
as well as regulatees, and how this imbues the regulatory standards that govern the use of 
such innovations with considerable flexibility. We also extend this perspective on regulation 
by showing how the regulatory standards governing EVATM were influenced by multiple, and 
partly competing, reform programmes centred on other innovations. In addition, we show 
how the mediating role of regulators enables regulatees to influence the evolution of 
regulatory standards and how this facilitates compliance with regulation and allows 
regulatees to adapt MAIs to industry-specific regulations and cultural characteristics. We 
discuss the implications of these findings for the sociological literature on regulation 
informing this paper and for research on the diffusion of MAIs.   
Key words: adaptation, diffusion, Economic Value Added, management accounting 
innovations, regulation, state-owned enterprises. 
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Regulation and Adaptation of Management Accounting Innovations: 
The Case of Economic Value Added in Thai State-Owned Enterprises 
 
1. Introduction 
The last three decades have witnessed a surge of innovation in management accounting 
techniques and practices. Academic research on management accounting innovations (MAIs), 
such as Activity-Based Costing and the Balanced Scorecard, has also flourished and now 
constitutes a substantial but rather diverse literature (see Euske and Malina, 2013; Ittner and 
Larcker, 2001; Zawawi and Hoque, 2010). An important stream of research concerns the 
diffusion of MAIs across organisations (see Ax and Bjørnenak, 2007; Granlund and Lukka, 
1998). Empirical inquiries into this topic have been dominated by survey-based studies 
exploring the influence of various contextual factors on the adoption, implementation and use 
of MAIs (e.g., Ax and Greve, 2017; Baird et al., 2004; Bjørnenak, 1997; Burkert and Lueg, 
2013; Gosselin, 1997; Johansson and Siverbo, 2009; Krumwiede, 1998; Lovata and Costigan, 
2002; Naranjo-Gil et al., 2009; Speckbacher et al., 2003). Most of this research portrays 
diffusion as a process of voluntary adoption of innovations, driven by either rational choice 
or imitation of other organisations, but also includes a smaller number of studies exploring 
how diffusion processes can be fuelled by compulsory regulation (e.g., Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 
2004; Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and Wright, 2004; Malmi, 1999). This latter body 
of research has studied the regulatory pressures to adopt MAIs in terms of coercive 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or forced selection (Abrahamson, 1991), but pays 
scant attention to how the regulatory standards that govern such innovations take shape. This 
arguably leads to a rather simplistic view of regulation as flowing unilaterally from 
regulators, such as government bodies or corporate headquarters1, and imposing relatively 
rigid standards on regulatees. However, a small but growing number of field studies have 
started to enrich this picture by showing how MAIs can be implicated in complex regulatory 
processes which leave considerable scope for the adaptation of such innovations (e.g., Ahrens 
and Khalifa, 2015; Hayne and Free, 2014; Hopper and Major, 2007; Modell, 2012a; Modell 
                                                          
1 Whilst most research on the diffusion of MAIs conceives of various government bodies as the source of 
compulsory regulation, we recognise that similar forms of regulation can emerge within individual organisations 
(see Ansari et al., 2014; Canato et al. 2013; Malmi, 1999). Hence, in principle, the substantive research problem 
advanced here should be seen as applicable to both settings, although our empirical analysis focuses on the 
former.  
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et al., 2007; Suutheewasinnon et al., 2016). This has recently led to calls for more research 
into how MAIs interact with wider regulatory processes in society (Modell, 2012b, 2014; 
Van der Stede, 2011; Wagenhofer, 2016). 
Answering the calls for more research into how MAIs interact with regulatory processes, 
whilst recognising that such processes can entail significant adaptations, is important for 
enhancing our understanding of how innovations come to vary as they diffuse within 
particular populations of organisations. Whilst much of the earlier research on the diffusion 
of management innovations tended to associate diffusion with strong pressures for uniformity 
(Abrahamson, 1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Strang and Soule, 1998), more recent work 
shows that diffusion processes almost inevitably foster variations as organisations adapt 
innovations to fit their specific circumstances (e.g., Ansari et al., 2010, 2014; Birkinshaw et 
al., 2008; Canato et al., 2013; Fiss et al., 2012; Gondo and Amis, 2013; O’Mahoney, 2007; 
Slager et al., 2012). Some of this recent research draws attention to the ways in which 
regulatory standards, governing the use of management innovations, come to entail a 
considerable amount of flexibility due to mutual adjustments between regulators and 
regulatees (Ansari et al., 2014; Canato et al., 2013; Slager et al., 2012). Similar observations 
have been made in the literature on MAIs by scholars who show that specific innovations can 
become imbued with considerable flexibility and that this flexibility enhances their 
applicability in a broad range of organisational contexts (Ax and Bjørnenak, 2005, 2007; 
Modell, 2009). However, little attention has been paid to how regulators and regulatees 
collectively work towards imbuing MAIs with the necessary degree of flexibility, and how 
this affects the use of such innovations. Even though increasing attention is now being paid to 
the so-called supply side of the diffusion of MAIs (e.g., Alcouffe et al., 2008; Ax and 
Bjørnenak, 2005; Cooper et al., 2017; Gibassier, 2017; Hayne and Free, 2014; Qu and 
Cooper, 2011), only a handful of studies provide insights into how the adaptation of such 
innovations can be shaped by the interventions of regulators as they liaise with suppliers 
(e.g., consultants) as well as the regulatees that have to adopt those innovations (Hopper and 
Major, 2007; Modell et al., 2007). In short, little is known about how regulators mediate the 
adaptations of MAIs and how this mediation affects the development of regulatory standards 
and the possibilities for regulatees to adapt the innovations to their organisation-specific 
needs. Addressing these issues is important to enhance our understanding of how MAIs are 
implicated in regulatory processes and how regulators affect the diffusion of such 
innovations. 
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The above discussion raises questions about the ways in which regulators mediate the 
adaptation of MAIs and how this mediation affects their use across regulatees. We explore 
these questions in relation to the diffusion of Economic Value Added (EVATM) in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in Thailand. The concept of EVATM is arguably one of the 
foremost MAIs emerging since the late 1980s (Bouwens and Spekle, 2007; Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998). As a financial management system promising to compel managers to 
maximise returns to shareholders, it has risen to prominence as an integral part of the 
shareholder value movement (Ezzamel et al., 2008; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Froud et al., 2000). 
Yet the diffusion of EVATM has been subject to relatively limited empirical research 
compared to other MAIs (Zawawi and Hoque, 2010). Whilst constituting a trademark-
protected innovation, devised by the US-based consulting firm Stern Stewart & Co, it has 
been introduced as an inherently flexible and adaptable system that is applicable in a broad 
range of organisational contexts (see e.g., Stern et al., 1995, 2001). Prior research has shown 
that EVATM use varies significantly across organisations (Burkert and Lueg, 2013; Malmi 
and Ikäheimo, 2003) and that variations are due, in part, to differences in the regulatory 
environments (Chiwamit et al., 2014; Francis and Minchington, 2002; McLaren et al., 2016). 
The diffusion of EVATM thus provides an interesting focus for a study of how regulators 
mediate the adaptation of MAIs and how this mediation affects the use of the innovations 
across regulatees.  
To theorise these issues we extend the literature on management innovations by drawing on 
sociological research on regulation, which stresses that the regulatory standards that govern 
innovations evolve through the collective efforts of diverse actors whilst being embedded in 
broader, societal reform programmes (see reviews by Brunsson et al., 2012; Djelic and den 
Hond, 2014; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010). In contrast to traditional approaches to 
regulation, based on a view of regulatory standards as predominantly devised by the State and 
imposed on regulatees in a unilateral manner, this perspective recognises the evolutionary 
nature of regulation as a collaborative process. In our research, we observe that the Thai 
government initially sought to impose EVATM in a relatively forceful manner to support the 
privatisation of SOEs, but that the regulatory standards devised to that end were gradually 
adapted as regulators collaborated with suppliers and individual SOEs to reconcile EVATM 
with the regulatory environment in which the SOEs are embedded.2 This collaborative 
                                                          
2 An earlier study (Chiwamit et al., 2014) compared this over-riding reform process with the introduction of 
EVATM in Chinese SOEs, where its diffusion has relied less heavily on external consultants whilst being subject 
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approach to regulation continued to evolve as the reform programme underpinning the 
diffusion of EVATM had to be adapted to other reform programmes and extant regulations. 
This imbued the regulatory standards governing the use of EVATM with considerable 
flexibility and enabled organisation-specific adaptations of the system to emerge across the 
individual SOEs. Our findings show that such adaptations varied with the differences in 
industry-specific regulations and cultural characteristics according to the extent to which they 
were (or were not) consistent with the EVATM system. We discuss the implications of these 
findings for the sociological literature on regulation informing this paper and for research on 
the diffusion of MAIs.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We start by advancing an analytical 
framework, grounded in the perspective on regulation as a collaborative process, and then we 
use this framework as a basis for reviewing extant research on how MAIs interact with 
regulatory processes. Next we describe the research methods applied, before offering a 
longitudinal analysis of the evolution of EVATM in the Thai SOE sector. The concluding 
section discusses our key contributions and their implications for future research on 
regulation and the diffusion of MAIs. 
 
2. Analytical Framework and Literature Review 
The efforts to re-conceptualise the way regulatory processes work, which inform this paper, 
have emerged against a backdrop of the changing face of regulation in contemporary society 
and have been spearheaded by attempts to expand the analysis of regulation in wider spheres 
of society, including the private as well as the public sectors. In contrast to the popular view 
that the past decades of globalisation and public policy reforms have ushered in an era of 
unprecedented deregulation, scholars have demonstrated that regulation is not only increasing 
(e.g., Djelic and Sahlin, 2009; Hall et al., 1999; Hood et al., 1999, 2000), but also that the 
nature of regulation is changing (e.g., Braithwaite, 2008; Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; 
Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Levi-Faure, 2005; Mörth, 2004). This literature is unified 
by a shift away from a view of the nation state as the regulator par excellence, exercising a 
monopoly on regulatory powers in society, to a growing recognition that a wider range of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to extensive state regulation. However, this earlier study did not examine the influence of individual SOEs on 
the development of regulatory standards and how this gives rise to organisation-specific variations in the use of 
EVATM.  
7 
 
actors, with vested interests, participate in regulatory processes and contribute to the shaping 
of regulatory systems. Even though nation states, represented by various government bodies, 
are still important actors in such processes, they are increasingly sharing responsibility for the 
development of regulation with other actors who have overlapping or conflicting interests. 
This is leading to a view of regulation as an evolving and relatively dispersed phenomenon 
that does not necessarily flow unilaterally from national governments. Instead, the 
development of regulation is increasingly seen as embedded in broader, societal reform 
programmes, promoting the spread of neo-liberalism and market competition, which state as 
well as non-state actors seek to influence (Braithwaite, 2008; Djelic and Sahlin, 2009; Levi-
Faure, 2005). 
The more specific focus of this paper is on the evolution of regulatory standards within such 
broader reform programmes. Research on this topic has grown into a substantial literature 
(e.g., Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Brunsson et al., 2012; Djelic and den Hond, 2014; 
Higgins and Tamm-Hallström, 2007; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010), which is exercising 
increasing influence on research on financial accounting standards (e.g., Alon and Dwyer, 
2016; Baudot, 2014; Botzem, 2014; Botzem and Quack, 2009) and other forms of extra-
organisational governance standards (e.g., Bozanic et al., 2012; Mehrpouya, 2015; 
Mehrpouya and Samiolo, 2016; Rasche, 2010). Much of this research has emphasised the 
voluntary nature of regulation and sees regulatory standards as a relatively malleable and 
flexible phenomenon (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010). An important insight underpinning 
this view is that the actors who are the subjects of regulation (the regulatees) often take an 
active part in shaping the regulatory standards which are used to govern their behaviour. This 
leads to an understanding of regulation as a collaborative process, requiring an element of 
voluntary participation and continuous adaptation, rather than the unilateral imposition of 
regulatory restrictions on recalcitrant regulatees (see e.g., Mehrpouya and Samiolo, 2016; 
Rasche, 2010). Whilst prior research on regulation has often regarded the involvement of 
regulatees as entailing a risk of regulatory capture, which allows vested interests to exercise 
undue influence over regulatory processes, the view of regulation advanced above suggests 
that such involvement often facilitates compliance with emerging standards (see e.g., Bozanic 
et al., 2012; Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Djelic and Sahlin, 2009). However, this does not 
mean that regulation is necessarily devoid of state-initiated sanctions or other forms of 
coercive pressures. State actors often continue to play an important role in policing regulatory 
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standards and overseeing compliance (Djelic and Sahlin, 2009; Rasche, 2010) and can fill a 
crucial role as mediators who facilitate the diffusion of such standards (Djelic, 2011).  
The view of regulation outlined above compels us to re-think the way in which the diffusion 
of management innovations unfolds and has two major implications for our analysis. First, 
the view of regulation as a dispersed phenomenon, involving a range of state and non-state 
actors, reinforces the need to re-conceptualise the processes through which management 
innovations are adapted as they diffuse across organisations. Much of the existing literature 
on management innovations invokes a relatively simple, market-like view of diffusion 
processes as flowing from a clearly defined supply side to the adopters who constitute the 
demand side (Ansari et al., 2010). This view generally implies a conception of innovations as 
initially generated by suppliers, such as influential management consultants, and then adopted 
and subsequently further adapted by individual organisations on a relatively autonomous 
basis (Ansari et al., 2010; Damanpour, 2014; Volberda et al., 2014). However, the literature 
on regulation informing our analysis underscores the need to move away from the conception 
of diffusion as a market-like phenomenon, and to pay attention to how regulators facilitate 
diffusion by working with both suppliers of management innovations and the regulatees to 
adapt ‘global’ innovations to particular social contexts (cf. Djelic, 2011). For instance, Slager 
et al. (2012) demonstrate how an emerging standard for producing a socially responsible 
investment index derived its regulatory power through a complex interplay between a range 
of actors, including the suppliers and adopters of the index as well as actors charged with 
regulating its use. Furthermore, the attempts to regulate the standard had several 
unanticipated consequences which prompted continuous adaptations to preserve its regulatory 
power as the diffusion process unfolded. This underlines the need to pay greater attention to 
adaptation as an ongoing process which involves repeated exchanges between the suppliers of 
innovations, the regulators and also the regulatees, as it evolves over time.   
Second, the insight that regulators are not necessarily impervious to the interests and needs of 
regulatees suggests that we need to avoid treating the diffusion of management innovations as 
a process of either voluntary adoption or coercive enforcement (cf. Abrahamson, 1991; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Whilst the literature on regulation reviewed above has 
emphasised the voluntary nature of standard-setting, such processes may need to be 
accompanied by an element of coercion to gain traction (Rasche, 2010; Timmermans and 
Epstein, 2010). Insofar as diffusion processes are mediated by regulators who possess 
coercive powers, we can expect an explicit or implicit threat of coercion to prevail, even 
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though the regulatees still enjoy significant discretion in complying with the regulations 
(Djelic and Sahlin, 2009). This introduces a certain degree of choice into the regulatory 
process and implies that regulatees may experience differences in the extent to which they 
can adapt particular innovations, even where the adoption of the innovations is compulsory. 
Suppliers and regulators may create a degree of choice by distinguishing between mandatory 
and discretionary attributes of particular innovations and thereby preserve a level of 
uniformity whilst simultaneously allowing regulatees to adapt the innovations to their 
specific circumstances (Ansari et al., 2014). For instance, Wright et al. (2012, p. 656) 
illustrate that consultants not only seek to adapt management innovations, but also to 
standardise some of their attributes and thus engage in “a form of consulting as regulation”. 
Hence the restrictions and choices available to regulators may be designed into the 
innovations at an early stage of the diffusion process, although regulators may try to 
influence them through their interactions with suppliers. Consistent with the view of 
regulation informing this paper, we also need to recognise that the efforts of regulators to 
balance restrictions and choices entail exchanges with the regulatees, which enable the latter 
to influence the standards governing their use of the innovations (cf. Ansari et al., 2014; 
Canato et al., 2013; Slager et al., 2012).     
Figure 1 summarises the regulatory dynamics discussed above and illustrates how regulators 
fill a mediating role by working with both suppliers and regulatees to adapt management 
innovations. Through their efforts to standardise and adapt innovations, suppliers offer 
regulators a mix of restrictions and choices which can enable the regulators to adapt the 
innovations to fit particular populations of organisations. By interacting with suppliers, 
regulators can also influence innovations before they are incorporated into regulatory 
standards. Through the standard-setting process regulators can impose further restrictions and 
regulate the choices available to regulatees, whilst the latter may also exercise a greater or 
lesser degree of influence over such processes. This may, in turn, affect the regulatees’ ability 
to adapt management innovations to their organisation-specific context and to generate 
variations in the use of such innovations. Although we do not expect all of the reciprocal 
relationships between suppliers, regulators and regulatees, depicted in Figure 1, to be equally 
salient over time, the figure provides a starting point for examining how regulatory dynamics 
evolve throughout the process of adapting management innovations. 
___________________ 
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Insert Figure 1 here. 
___________________ 
Extant research on MAIs only provides partial and fragmented evidence about the way the 
regulatory dynamics depicted in Figure 1 unfold. Starting with the relationship between 
suppliers and regulators, several studies have noted that MAIs propagated by influential 
academics and consultants can have a more or less direct impact on the mix of choices and 
restrictions embedded in regulatory standards (e.g., Chang, 2009; Hayne and Free, 2014; 
Modell, 2012b; Northcott and France, 2005; Suutheewasinnon et al., 2016). Chang (2009), 
for instance, illustrates how the Balanced Scorecard was used as a template for the 
development of a new performance measurement system in the UK National Health Service 
and how this restricted the pursuit of performance improvements to politically significant 
targets. Similarly, Hayne and Free (2014) document how a broad range of actors, including 
academics, consultants and professional bodies, who espoused diverse conceptions of risk 
management, worked together with a regulatory body (the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations) to establish a new regulatory standard for Enterprise Risk Management. Their 
study provides a rich account of how the collective deliberations of a dispersed set of actors 
imbued an essentially voluntary risk management standard with regulatory power (cf. 
Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). However, it provides few insights into whether or how 
regulatees influenced the development of the standard once it started to diffuse across various 
social contexts. As demonstrated by Paape and Spekle (2012), this standard has given a 
considerable impetus to the adoption of risk management practices, but has had little impact 
on the effectiveness of those practices. This underlines the need to extend research on MAIs 
beyond the evolving relationships between suppliers and regulators and to explore how 
regulatory processes enable regulatees to influence the innovations and how this affects their 
efficacy in particular contexts.  
Existing research which has examined the ways in which the relationships between regulators 
and regulatees shape the diffusion of MAIs has mainly documented how regulatees respond 
to pressures for compulsory adoption of particular innovations (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2003; 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and Wright, 2004; Malmi, 
1999; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Much of this research shows that the restrictions 
associated with such pressures often exacerbate the problems of adapting innovations to 
operating-level activities and foster relatively symbolic compliance (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 
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2003; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). However, some studies 
illustrate that regulation entailing a greater degree of voluntary compliance, or choice, can 
encourage regulatees to adapt the innovations and to embed them in their management 
control practices (Ahrens and Khalifa, 2015; Modell, 2012a). For instance, Modell (2012a) 
illustrates how a Swedish central government agency initially adopted the Balanced 
Scorecard on a voluntary basis, but subsequently adapted it to the emerging regulatory 
priorities of the Government. This led to a situation in which the control practices emanating 
from the Balanced Scorecard gradually formed an integral part of the agency’s monitoring of 
its compliance with government regulation. However, the research which has explored the 
way individual organisations respond to regulatory pressures to adopt MAIs has paid little 
attention to the ability of regulatees to influence the regulatory standards governing those 
innovations.  
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have sought to bridge the gap between the 
two strands of research reviewed above and thereby advance a more holistic view of the way 
in which regulators mediate the adaptation of MAIs (Hopper and Major, 2007; Modell et al., 
2007). Both studies explore how regulatory standards evolved through collaboration between 
suppliers and regulators, and how this collaboration subsequently opened up opportunities for 
regulatees to adapt the innovations. Hopper and Major (2007) show that a consulting firm 
persuaded the European Commission to use Activity-Based Costing as the basis for price 
regulation in the market for telecommunication services in the European Union. They then 
study how the regulatory standards emerging from this interplay enabled an individual 
telecommunications operator to adapt Activity-Based Costing and render it useful for 
managerial decision-making. Similarly, Modell et al. (2007) illustrate how novel 
performance measurement practices, inspired by Total Quality Management, were partly 
incorporated into a new governance model for Swedish central government agencies and how 
this enabled individual agencies to adapt the model to their organisation-specific needs. 
These findings show that regulators fill an important mediating role between suppliers and 
regulatees that facilitates the adaptation of MAIs. However, similar to the other studies of 
MAIs reviewed above, neither Hopper and Major (2007) nor Modell et al. (2007) offer 
detailed insights into how regulatees can exercise more direct influence on regulatory 
standards. Moreover, neither of these studies explored how variations in the use of MAIs 
emerge as a result of adaptations that have their origins in different organisational contexts. 
Hence, we have very limited knowledge of how regulatees can work with regulators to 
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influence the standards which govern MAIs and how the restrictions and choices embedded 
in such standards can breed variations in the use of those innovations across organisations.  
Our review of how MAIs can become implicated in regulatory processes underlines the need 
for further research into the complex interplay between suppliers, regulators and regulatees, 
and how this interplay affects the adaptation of the innovations. In particular, it draws 
attention to the paucity of more holistic studies of how regulators mediate such adaptations as 
they evolve over time and how regulatees can influence the process of adaptation such that it 
meets their organisation-specific needs. Even where the mediating role of regulators has been 
a key focal point (Hopper and Major, 2007; Modell et al., 2007), little attention has been paid 
to the involvement of regulatees in the formation of the regulatory standards that govern 
MAIs. This stands in stark contrast to research on other types of accounting standards, which 
has increasingly emphasised the influence of regulatees on the standard-setting process (e.g., 
Alon and Dwyer, 2016; Bozanic et al., 2012; Mehrpouya and Samiolo, 2016). Addressing 
these limitations is important in order to enhance our understanding of regulation as a 
collaborative process, and thereby to move beyond market-like depictions of diffusion which 
confine the analysis to the interactions between suppliers and adopters. In what follows, we 
examine  how regulators mediated the adaptation of MAIs, such as EVATM, and how such 
innovations evolved as an integral part of the broader reform programmes unfolding in the 
Thai SOE sector. 
 
3. Research Methods 
To examine how regulators mediated the adaptation of EVATM in the Thai SOE sector and 
how this affected its use across individual enterprises, we collected data at multiple levels 
within this sector and combined a process-orientated research approach (Langley, 1999; 
Langley et al., 2013) with comparative case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). A process-orientated 
approach, mapping the actions of a broad range of relevant actors, is necessary for enhancing 
our understanding of regulation as an evolving phenomenon and for exploring how 
adaptations unfold over time (Djelic and den Hond, 2014). However, to capture variations 
emerging from regulatees’ responses to regulatory initiatives and to explore the organisation-
specific adaptations of EVATM in some detail, we also conducted deeper case studies in two 
SOEs. Whilst comparative case studies may compromise some of the depth and richness 
associated with qualitative inquiries (Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Dyer and Wilkins, 1991), we 
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see it as a useful approach for building theory, concerning how and why adaptations are 
made, which may in turn inform large-scale diffusion studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007). The choice of such an approach, as a way of furthering theory 
development, would also seem justifiable given the current lack of detailed understandings of 
how the mediating role of regulators affects the use of MAIs across regulatees (Edmondson 
and McManus, 2007). Following emerging calls for examining how industry-specific 
conditions affect management accounting practices (Messner, 2016), we initially approached 
four SOEs facing somewhat different regulatory environments as a result of variations in 
reforms and industry-specific regulations. Following initial interviews across all four SOEs, 
we chose to deepen the data collection in two of them (UtilityCo and BankCo3) as they 
seemed to face different challenges in adapting EVATM to industry-specific conditions. 
However, data from one of the SOEs not included in our comparative case analysis (PTT Ltd) 
informed our analysis as it was one of the earliest adopters of EVATM in the Thai SOE sector 
and has occupied an important role in advising other SOEs about how to implement and use it 
as a performance management system (see Chiwamit et al., 2014).    
Data collection primarily comprised semi-structured interviews and documents. Interviews 
were conducted with a broad range of actors involved in the dissemination and adaptation of 
EVATM in the Thai SOE sector. Of particular importance were interviews with 
representatives of the key regulatory agency for Thai SOEs – the State Enterprise Policy 
Office (SEPO) – and independent consultants, such as Stern Stewart Thailand (SST) and Thai 
Rating and Information Services (TRIS), who worked in close collaboration with the SEPO. 
Within the two SOEs under deeper examination, we conducted interviews with senior 
executives, relevant staff specialists and a representative cross-section of middle managers 
across various business units. Most interviews were carried out on a one-to-one basis by the 
principal investigator (the first-named author), and key informants were interviewed on more 
than one occasion. In total, 87 interviews were conducted; the vast majority taking place 
between 2010 and 2012, whilst a small number of follow-up interviews were conducted in 
2014 and 2016 (see Appendix for a list of interviewees). All but eight interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. Where recording was not possible, extensive notes were 
taken and transcribed into coherent summaries as soon as possible after each interview. The 
documents collected were of a public as well as proprietary nature, and primarily comprise 
various policy documents (e.g., feasibility studies, government regulations), consultants’ 
                                                          
3 The two SOEs under deeper examination have been anonymised. 
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reports and presentations, and such organisation-specific documents as annual reports, 
performance evaluation reports and planning documents, as well as documents pertaining to 
industry-specific regulation. Interview data and documents were complemented with the 
systematic maintenance of a research diary and occasional informal discussions with various 
informants to validate emerging interpretations and to delve further into specific issues.   
Throughout the process of data collection, the data were continuously analysed by (1) 
mapping within-case regularities using both open-ended and more thematic coding and (2) 
searching for cross-case patterns and relating those patterns to more general developments 
within the Thai SOE sector (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989). Given the retrospective nature of much of 
our analysis, we combined these analytical procedures with systematic cross-checking of 
interview data and other data sources to address the risk of bias due to memory loss among 
our interviewees. This part of the analysis was facilitated by the involvement of the principal 
investigator as a consultant, employed by the SST, in several EVATM implementation projects 
between 2005 and 2007. For the purpose of the present paper, we extended the analysis by 
examining the more specific roles of the SEPO in mediating the adaptations of EVATM over 
time. In doing so, we adopted a temporal bracketing strategy (Langley, 1999) to identify 
distinct analytical phases in the process of adaptation and searched for evidence of regulatory 
dynamics, such as those depicted in Figure 1, across these phases. This formed a starting 
point for tracing the adaptations that unfolded on the supply-side, in relation to the evolving 
regulatory standards, as well as within the two SOEs under deeper analysis. The time period 
of the analysis extends primarily from 2001 to 2012 and is sub-divided into three distinct 
phases (see Table 1). The ensuing empirical account closely follows this temporal bracketing. 
__________________ 
Insert Table 1 here! 
__________________ 
 
4. The Development of EVATM in the Thai SOE Sector 
 
4.1 The Introduction of EVATM (2001-2006) 
     4.1.1 Reform context and the emergence of EVATM 
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The introduction of EVATM in Thai SOEs emerged as an integral part of a longer sequence of 
governance reforms that started in the mid-1990s. In 1995, the Thai government implemented 
a performance management system known as the State Enterprise Performance Evaluation 
System (SEPES) as part of its fulfilment of the conditions of a financial aid package 
coordinated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (see World Bank, 
1994). The system entailed performance agreements and bonus programmes based on a range 
of financial and non-financial indicators devised to capture firm-specific characteristics of 
each SOE and was to be monitored and further developed by the SEPO on behalf of the 
Ministry of Finance. The World Bank also recommended the Thai government to launch a 
programme of privatisation and gradually transform its SOEs into more commercially 
orientated corporations. However, it was only after the election of Thaksin Shinawatra as 
Prime Minister in 2001 that more forceful privatisation efforts emerged and that EVATM was 
adopted to facilitate this development. Following an invitation to Stern Stewart to visit 
Thailand in 2002, EVATM began to be promoted as a system that would improve the 
efficiency of SOEs and render them more focused on delivering shareholder value, thereby 
enhancing their attractiveness to private investors. Close personal ties were established 
between the Prime Minister and a local businessman, who became the Chairman of Stern 
Stewart’s newly formed Thai subsidiary (SST). In 2003, the SEPO was instructed to start 
developing EVATM as a governance mechanism for SOEs and it subsequently commissioned 
SST to conduct a broadly based feasibility study in 35 SOEs and initiated deeper pilot 
projects in four of those enterprises (including UtilityCo). These initiatives finally informed 
the government decision to introduce EVATM as a compulsory performance measure for 40 
out of 58 SOEs in 2006.4  
Similar to many Western countries (see e.g., Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Froud et al., 2000), 
EVATM was introduced as an integral part of a reform programme which bore the imprint of 
the shareholder value movement. Consulting firms, such as Stern Stewart, have arguably 
been a key exponent of this movement (Froud et al., 2000) and, together with the Prime 
Minister, they took an active part in promoting EVATM as a means of increasing the financial 
returns of SOEs (Chiwamit et al., 2014).  The strong political support for the use of EVATM 
emanating from the Prime Minister and his political associates, who in some cases made 
substantial gains from privatisation, persisted over the period leading up to its introduction as 
a compulsory performance measure for the majority of SOEs in 2006. As explained below, 
                                                          
4 Only SOEs without significant commercial operations were to be exempt from using EVATM.  
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however, a number of adaptations, which effectively restricted the aggressive pursuit of 
shareholder value creation, were already initiated at this time due to the need to reconcile 
EVATM with other emerging reform programmes and extant governance practices.    
  
4.1.2 Supply-side adaptations 
According to Stern Stewart, EVATM should be seen as “the centrepiece of a completely 
integrated framework of financial management and incentive compensation” (Stern et al., 
1995, pp. 45-46), which purports to improve the alignment of managerial interests with those 
of shareholders. To achieve this end, a number of changes to performance measurement and 
incentive systems, based on traditional financial measures such as accounting profits and 
return on investment, are suggested. Similar to the concept of residual income, EVATM is 
calculated by adjusting accounting profits for the risk-adjusted cost of capital5 to sensitise 
managers to the demands for long-term returns to shareholders. Moreover, EVATM is ideally 
seen as a stand-alone system, replacing a broader range of often inconsistent and 
disconnected performance measures, and providing a powerful vehicle for decentralisation 
within organisations (see Stern et al., 1995, 2001). By disaggregating EVATM across the 
corporate hierarchy and combining it with far-reaching delegation of decision-making rights, 
managers are allegedly empowered to manage assets and to make capital allocation decisions 
on the same basis as shareholders. Furthermore, Stern Stewart argues that, to incentivise 
managers to maximise shareholder value, bonuses should be based on the achievement of 
objective targets, preventing the creation of budgetary slack, and should, in principle, be 
unlimited and proportional to performance improvements (see Stern et al., 1995, 2001). 
Although Stern Stewart originally planned to apply many of these attributes of the EVATM 
system to Thai SOEs key regulators, such as the Ministry of Finance, were able to exercise 
considerable influence over it and sought to adapt it to extant governance practices at an early 
stage. The structuring of extant performance agreements for SOEs around a broad range of 
enterprise-specific financial and non-financial performance indicators presented a major 
                                                          
5 EVATM is generally calculated as Net Operating Profit after Taxes (NOPAT) minus a Capital Charge. Capital 
Charge = Capital Employed x Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). WACC = (% equity x cost of 
equity) + (% debt x after-tax cost of debt). Cost of Equity = Rf + (β x Market Risk Premium), where Rf is the 
“risk-free” interest rate on long-term government bonds, β is firm- or industry-specific risk and Market Risk 
Premium is the return that a particular stock market yields above the average return on long-term government 
bonds. 
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obstacle to the use of EVATM as a stand-alone system. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance did 
not share the Prime Minister’s enthusiasm for maximising shareholder value and effectively 
supported a competing reform programme, pivoting on the promotion of the Balanced 
Scorecard as a more general template for performance management in the Thai public sector 
(see Sutheewasinnon et al., 2016). At the time of Stern Stewart’s arrival, several SOEs had 
adopted the Balanced Scorecard and the Minister of Finance reportedly saw this innovation 
as more compatible with the SEPES. This prompted Stern Stewart to adapt EVATM. Local 
SST staff went to considerable lengths to explain how EVATM might complement, rather than 
compete with, the Balanced Scorecard. For instance, when presenting EVATM to the Ministry 
of Finance, they pointed out that the suppliers of the Balanced Scorecard propose that EVATM 
should be the primary financial metric in any balanced scorecard. Hence, rather than insisting 
on the use of  EVATM as a stand-alone system aimed at maximising shareholder value, SST 
effectively began promoting a more flexible version which gave the regulators a greater 
degree of choice in adapting it to the needs of SOEs. Yet, it was only after one of the SOEs, 
which had adopted the Balanced Scorecard, experienced a severe liquidity crisis in 2003 that 
the Minister of Finance was finally won over and the decision was taken to introduce EVATM 
alongside the ongoing efforts to implement the Balanced Scorecard.  
The introduction of EVATM to the Thai SOE sector illustrates how the existence of two 
competing reform programmes, centred on different MAIs, can enable regulators to influence 
such innovations at an early stage of their diffusion. This contrasts with prior research on 
regulatory standards, which has mainly examined individual management innovations in 
isolation from each other, although the multiplicity of standards governing such innovations 
is occasionally recognised (see Djelic and den Hond, 2014; Rasche, 2010; Timmermans and 
Epstein, 2010). As explained below, the early supply-side adaptations of  EVATM, preventing 
it from becoming a stand-alone system, had major implications for the SEPO’s subsequent 
work on turning it into more specific regulatory standards.  
 
4.1.3 Adaptations of regulatory standards 
The feasibility study and the pilot projects that followed the decision to adopt EVATM were 
carried out between 2003 and 2005 and prompted the SEPO to undertake significant 
adaptations of EVATM. Similar to the Ministry of Finance, the SEPO was not entirely aligned 
with the Prime Minister’s ambition to increase shareholder value and was sensitive to the 
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emerging concerns of individual SOEs that this reform programme might jeopardise their 
achievement of broader political and social objectives and foster resistance from trade 
unitons. The feasibility study and pilot projects provided a channel through which individual 
SOEs could influence the development of regulatory standards and restrict the pursuit of 
shareholder value creation. For instance, the concerns raised by SOEs and their use of the 
Balanced Scorecard, together with the advice offered by SST, reinforced the SEPO’s 
conviction that EVATM needed to be used as part of a broader performance management 
system. One senior SEPO official recalled: 
The Balanced Scorecard concepts have long been adopted to formulate performance 
indicators for the performance agreements … Although we did not force SOEs to 
implement Balanced Scorecards, SOEs have gradually learned about the Balanced 
Scorecard. We did recognise the weaknesses of the two systems [i.e. EVATM and the 
Balanced Scorecard]. Thus, when SST convinced us that EVATM and the Balanced 
Scorecard would complement each other well, we decided to introduce them as a 
package. (Deputy Director, the SEPO, 10/11/2010) 
These findings show how the enduring influence of two reform programmes, centred on 
different MAIs, on the development of regulatory standards restricted the possibilities to 
boost financial returns at the expense of other performance dimensions. The SEPO initially 
decided to give EVATM a 15 per cent weight in the performance agreements of individual 
SOEs. However, despite the efforts of SOEs to influence emerging standards, some of our 
interviewees suggested that the weight attached to EVATM was still relatively significant, as 
few other indicators carried a higher weight in their performance agreements.  
The experiences of individual SOEs also influenced other key adaptations of the EVATM 
system, such as the calculation of the cost of capital. Several of the SOEs participating in the 
feasibility study experienced significant difficulties in estimating the risk-adjusted weighted 
average cost of capital (i.e. WACC) due to a lack of long-term data on firm-specific risk (i.e., 
β) for shares traded on the Thai stock market. Furthermore, the difficulties were compounded 
by the fact that the vast majority of Thai SOEs were not publically traded and thus lacked 
information about their firm-specific risk relative to common market risk. This led the 
consultants advising the SEPO to recommend the use of a rather arbitrary measures of risk. 
The ex-country manager of SST overseeing the estimations of the WACC explained:  
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Capital markets for emerging markets like Thailand are not stable and do not 
provide sufficient data for the WACC calculation. Thus, SST needed to use 
information from a New York University data base to calculate proxies for β, 
using peers within the same industry. In addition, to eliminate any short-term 
fluctuations in determining the market risk premium, which requires long-term 
data on the premium the market is willing to pay, SST used a country risk 
premium and added a global market risk premium where sufficient long term data 
were available. (Ex-Country Manager, SST, 29/12/2010) 
Given the considerable difficulties in calculating the WACC, the SEPO has since refrained 
from undertaking major changes in the industry-specific measures of cost of capital devised 
for individual SOEs. One of our interviewees explained:     
The SEPO decided to standardise the WACC calculation by announcing key 
parameters for each industry. Although the SEPO updates such parameters every 
year, the values are quite stable. So, now, we have relatively fixed charges for 
capital. […] The quantitative measurement of EVATM is not very different to 
analysing budget variances. Increases in EVATM mainly come from net profit, as 
WACC is frozen. (Vice Director, TRIS, 17/01/2011) 
These adaptations of EVATM effectively restricted the pressures on SOEs to produce 
continuous improvements in shareholder value. Capital charges have not been used as a 
means of compelling SOEs to deliver year-on-year growth in financial returns. Due to the 
difficulties in estimating costs of capital for particular industry segments, SOEs have also 
been granted a degree of choice in the use of costs of capital. They can either use enterprise-
wide WACC rates across their entire organisations or differentiate these rates for individual 
business units if they deem it meaningful. 
In addition to the immediate concerns and experiences of individual SOEs, the SEPO had to 
adapt EVATM to extant regulations of remuneration practices in a manner which further 
restricted the Prime Minister’s pursuit of shareholder value creation. From the very outset, 
the use of unlimited bonus plans to boost financial returns was infeasible because of the long-
standing government regulation which restricted the annual bonuses of SOE managers to a 
maximum of eight months’ salary. Following the incorporation of EVATM into the SEPES, 
bonuses were based on the overall achievement of a broad range of performance targets, 
rather than being exclusively based on financial performance improvements. As a result, the 
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achievement of EVATM targets has a relatively limited impact on pay. The SEPO also relaxed 
the pressures to base bonuses on EVATM by making their use compulsory only for Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs), although it did encourage SOEs to extend such plans to lower 
levels where appropriate. These relatively limited changes in remuneration practices were 
also influenced by the SEPO’s sensitivity to cultural characteristics of the SOEs and, 
especially, the Thai culture of Krengjai6, which are averse to the aggressive pursuit of 
shareholder value creation. The notion of Krengjai is intimately associated with the 
pronounced reluctance of Thai managers to penalise employees, as this would violate the 
culture of saving face. This has limited SOEs’ propensity to use aggressive incentive plans 
based on rigorously enforced performance targets. Some interviewees also emphasised that 
the cultural barriers to the use of EVATM were reinforced by the rather routine, conservative 
and relaxed work environment ingrained in many SOEs. A policy advisor closely affiliated 
with the SEPO summarised the consequences of such barriers for SOEs’ adaptation of 
incentive systems:       
We do not want to be too aggressive about internal incentive plans because they 
can lead to conflicts among individual units. Since SOEs were established, 
profitable SOEs have received a fixed bonus pool equal to nine per cent of profit, 
but not more than five months’ salary. We changed to paying different corporate 
bonuses based on nine levels of performance in 1995. But SOE staff still believe 
that bonuses are part of the salaries that they must receive, and most managers 
dare not change it. Until now, although management has a right to apportion 
employees’ bonuses based on their individual performance, as far as I know only 
two SOEs do that. … Thus, we try not to deviate much from the existing bonus 
system. (Senior Executive and Fiscal Advisor, Ministry of Finance, 12/10/2010) 
Consistent with prior research on regulatory standards (e.g., Alon and Dwyer, 2016; Bozanic 
et al., 2012; Mehrpouya and Samiolo, 2016), the initial development of such standards for 
EVATM thus entailed significant adaptations which were partly influenced by the emerging 
concerns and experiences of SOEs. This imbued the regulatory standards with a mix of 
restrictions and choices. Some attributes were mandatory, such as the need to give EVATM a 
particular weight in performance agreements, but SOEs were allowed discretion in the 
calculation of the WACC and in the use of EVATM as part of their incentive plans. Whilst 
                                                          
6 The notion of Krengjai generally implies thinking about others' feelings, being very considerate and 
disinclined to offend or disturb (Thanasankit and Corbitt, 2002). 
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these adaptations did not eliminate the possibilities for SOEs to increase financial returns, 
they diverted attention from the reform programme endorsed by Prime Minister. However, 
despite the enduring influence of other reform programmes, such as the one centred on the 
Balanced Scorecard, the SEPO was still under considerable political pressure to align SOEs 
with the Prime Minister’s pursuit of shareholder value. At the time EVATM became a 
compulsory requirement for Thai SOEs, the SEPO planned to gradually increase the weight 
of EVATM in performance agreements and to implement objective target-setting procedures 
aimed at continuous performance improvement. Furthermore, it required SOEs to establish 
relatively independent EVATM centres below the corporate level as a means of decentralising 
financial decision-making. As explained below, however, the pressures on SOE to increase 
financial returns were further reduced as EVATM underwent further adaptations over the 
following years. 
 
4.2 Compulsory Use and Further Adaptations of EVATM (2006-2010) 
4.2.1 Unfolding reform context 
The decision to make the adoption of EVATM a compulsory requirement for the majority of 
Thai SOEs coincided with a period of growing political turbulence, which culminated in the 
military’s ousting of the Shinawatra government in a ‘bloodless coup’ in September 2006. 
The popular protests against the Government were partly fuelled by corruption charges linked 
to the Government’s far-reaching plans to privatise SOEs and concerns that the privatisation 
of SOEs would erode public service levels. Trade unions also feared job losses. Their 
resistance to privatisation was particularly strong in one of our case organisations (UtilityCo), 
which led to a court decision that blocked further privatisation initiatives. Hence, by the time 
the Shinawatra government was ousted only six SOEs had been part-privatised and listed on 
the Thai stock exchange. Following these developments, the reform programme aimed at 
transforming SOEs into more shareholder-focused entities lost much of its momentum and 
the majority of the SOEs have maintained their status as wholly state-owned entities. 
Regardless of these developments, work on developing the EVATM system as a compulsory 
requirement for the majority of SOEs continued under the auspices of the SEPO. According 
to our interviewees, important reasons for this were that the SEPO saw the system as useful 
for enhancing the efficiency of SOEs and that it would be difficult to reverse the political 
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decision to use it as a compulsory governance mechanism. The work on developing the 
EVATM system was largely completed between 2006 and 2009 and initially saw the SEPO 
collaborating closely with SST and other consulting firms. A range of initiatives, devised to 
help SOEs resolve emerging problems and to provide opportunities for ongoing consultation 
(e.g., through weekly workshops, the establishment of an EVATM call centre and a project 
called ‘the EVATM clinic’), resulted from this work. However, over time the SEPO reduced 
its dependence on consultants and started to rely more heavily on early adopters of EVATM, 
such as PTT7, to share its experiences with other SOEs and to develop the system in close 
collaboration with individual enterprises. Enterprises which were particularly important for 
the country’s economic development, such as UtilityCo, were singled out for special 
assistance aimed at resolving implementation problems. As explained below, this 
collaborative approach enabled the SOEs to exercise considerable influence on the continued 
adaptation of the regulatory standards governing the use of EVATM. 
 
4.2.2 Adaptations of regulatory standards 
Through the various consultation fora set up to facilitate the implementation of EVATM, the 
SEPO became sensitised to emerging problems and aware of requests from SOEs to make 
further adaptations to the system. Several SOEs continued to raise concerns that excessive 
reliance on financial performance indicators, such as EVATM, might jeopardise their broader 
political and social objectives as providers of public utilities and services. At the same time, 
the demise of the Shinawatra government reduced the political pressures on the SEPO to 
increase the weight attached to EVATM to increase shareholder value. Although the SEPO 
was still interested in finding ways of enhancing the efficiency of SOEs, it continued to share 
the concerns of many SOEs that excessive pressure for financial returns might jeopardise 
wider stakeholder interests. Hence, over the period 2006-09, the SEPO reduced the weight 
attached to EVATM in the performance agreements from 15 to around 10 per cent. A senior 
SEPO official described the backdrop to this reduced weight as follows: 
We did not increase the weight of EVATM as initially expected because we found 
that the EVATM figures are not really reflecting true economic value. … We 
reduced the weight given to EVATM because we think that we have closely 
monitored the important stages of EVATM implementation, which required a 
                                                          
7 PTT was the only SOE which adopted EVATM on a voluntary basis before SST was commissioned to assess its 
feasibility on a large scale in the Thai SOE sector.  
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significant weight. Now, the EVATM system has been deployed to operational 
units lower down the organisation, which is very difficult to evaluate correctly and 
fairly. (Head of SOE Performance Evaluation Division, the SEPO, 11/10/2010) 
This quote suggests that the decision to reduce the weight attached to EVATM in performance 
agreements, and thereby alleviate the pressures on SOEs to prioritise financial returns, was 
partly prompted by the problems experienced by many SOEs in using EVATM at lower 
organisational levels. As the implementation of EVATM progressed, several SOEs (including 
UtilityCo) raised concerns about the possibilities of establishing independent EVATM centres, 
due to the complex interdependencies between organisational sub-units and the consequent 
need for centralised coordination. Our interviewees indicated that this often gave rise to 
highly arbitrary allocation practices which reduced the informativeness of EVATM metrics. 
For instance, a senior SEPO official explained:    
Sub-unit EVATM calculation is disputable because many SOEs have an integrated 
organisational structure, which makes it very difficult and problematic to 
accurately allocate costs and revenues to their sub-units. In addition, many of 
them do not have a suitable information system and a sufficient database to enable 
them to do that. So, now it is like we have put the EVATM concepts, approach and 
template in place for them, but what we are not sure of is the accuracy of the 
information they use in calculating sub-unit EVATM. (Deputy Director, the SEPO, 
10/11/2010) 
In addition to the problems caused by interdependencies within individual SOEs, the ability 
of SOEs to decentralise capital investment decisions was constrained by strict political 
regulations preventing them from flexibly using assets as a means of increasing EVATM 
performance and thereby jeopardising public assets and service levels. Hence, the barriers to 
using independent EVATM centres to decentralise financial decision-making were not only 
due to resistance from individual SOEs, but also to extant regulatory restrictions. In response 
to such problems, the SEPO eventually settled for the requirement that SOEs have to 
establish EVATM centres at the business unit level immediately below the corporate level, 
although they can also opt to apply it at lower levels if they deem it appropriate. This 
represents a relaxation of regulatory standards, and gives SOEs a greater degree of choice, 
compared to the initial plans to use independent EVATM centres relatively extensively 
throughout SOEs as a means of facilitating decentralisation.  
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Emerging objections from SOEs also prompted adaptations of the target-setting practices 
associated with EVATM. Although SST originally advised the SEPO to replace the use of 
negotiated budgetary targets with more objective targets to stimulate continuous 
improvements, these plans had to be abandoned due to widespread complaints from SOEs 
that such practices were difficult to reconcile with extant regulations. Both UtilityCo and 
BankCo raised such concerns and a senior SEPO official recalled how this had led to further 
adaptations: 
We got a lot of complaints from SOEs about continuous improvement targets. 
Many SOEs disliked the EVATM system because they felt that this ambitious 
continuous improvement goal does not match their missions. After we 
reconsidered this, we started to recognise that the continuous improvement target 
is not quite appropriate for most SOEs because their ultimate goals are not to 
maximise financial value, and the operations of some SOEs are regulated. 
Therefore, we decided to change our approach to setting EVATM targets based on 
SOEs’ business plans as well as budgets. (Head of SOE Performance Evaluation 
Division, the SEPO, 02/08/2011)  
However, whilst the maintenance of negotiated targets was considered necessary to enhance 
SOEs’ acceptance of the EVATM system, it reportedly resulted in the majority of SOEs 
finding EVATM targets to be rather easily achievable. Hence, this adaptation further detracted 
from the reform programme set in motion by Prime Minister Shinawatrs. 
The discussion above suggests that through their continued consultations with the SEPO 
SOEs were able to exercise considerable influence over the unfolding development of 
regulatory standards. This collaborative approach to standard-setting led to further 
adaptations of EVATM whereby a balance was maintained between the choices and 
restrictions embedded in the standards.  Some attributes, such as the need to give EVATM a 
particular weight in performance agreements and for SOEs to disaggregate EVATM to the 
business unit level, remained mandatory, whilst SOEs were given greater discretion as to how 
far down the hierarchy to use the system. Whilst these findings are, again, consistent with the 
literature on regulation informing this paper (e.g., Alon and Dwyer, 2016; Bozanic et al., 
2012; Mehrpouya and Samiolo, 2016), individual SOEs differed significantly in the extent to 
which they took advantage of the choices embedded in the regulatory standards due to 
variations in industry-specific regulations and cultural characteristics. 
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4.2.3 Organisation-specific adaptations among regulatees 
4.2.3.1 UtilityCo 
UtilityCo is one of three SOEs in the Thai electricity industry and it occupies the dominant 
position as the largest power generator in the country and it controls the distribution of 
electricity. It is the sole buyer of electricity from private sector generators and it transmits this 
electricity to the two other SOEs which function as retailers on a nation-wide basis. Under the 
plans of the Shinawatra government to privatise the company in the early 2000s, UtilityCo 
was required to account separately for its generation and transmission activities, as the former 
was the initial target for stock-market listing. Operations were subsequently organised into 
four operating business units (Fuel, Generation, Transmission and Development) and six 
support business units, which are all treated as EVATM centres. The EVATM system was first 
introduced into UtilityCo in 2003, as the company was selected by SST to take part in the 
initial feasibility study, and it was subsequently implemented from 2005 to support the 
Government’s privatisation plans. At that stage, UtilityCo’s management reportedly intended 
to use EVATM quite extensively and it expected to reap considerable benefits from doing so: 
The privatisation of UtilityCo was expected to bring a more efficient and 
competitive electricity market. Although the privatisation would directly impact 
the Generation Unit, other units would inevitably be forced to increase efficiency. 
… To operate in this challenging environment, better measures of sub-unit 
performance are crucial. … Many of our executives believed that the EVATM 
system would direct management decisions towards value creation, realistically 
planning power plants’ performance, measuring efficiency as well as effectiveness 
of power plants, and eventually offering a more challenging incentive scheme. 
(Deputy Governor, Accounting and Finance Business Unit, 08/12/2010) 
However, the relatively ambitious plans to implement the EVATM system were scaled back 
considerably in the wake of the court decision which blocked the privatisation of UtilityCo in 
2006. Even though the use of EVATM became a compulsory requirement around the same 
time, UtilityCo refrained from extending its use below the business-unit level, except in the 
Generation Unit, where EVATM was disaggregated to individual power plants. As noted 
above, UtilityCo was one of the SOEs that raised concerns, in the ongoing consultations with 
the SEPO, about the problems of disaggregating EVATM due to the difficulties of establishing 
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independent EVATM centres at lower organisational levels and also about the use of 
continuous improvement performance targets. A centrally positioned manager in UitlityCo 
described how these consultations influenced the regulatory standards devised by the SEPO:  
We consistently argued that an EVATM benchmark, set as a percentage increase from 
the previous year, is not applicable for UtilityCo. … the SEPO did understand, and 
suggested we set an EVATM target based on budgets. In my opinion, this budget based 
approach is not very useful. However, I think that the SEPO wanted to apply the same 
approach across SOEs. … Eventually, most SOEs adopted the budget based approach. 
(Deputy Governor, Policy and Planning Business Unit, 09/12/2010) 
Similar to the experiences of many other SOEs, the reduced emphasis on financial returns 
that followed from these adaptations of regulatory standards was seen as being consistent 
with the wider social and political objectives of UtilityCo and, also, with the technical, 
engineering-based mind set dominating the organisation. One of our interviewees explained:  
The key success factors of power plants are. ... First is the technical capacity and 
efficiency of plants and machines, which will affect our ‘heat rate’. Second is the 
‘availability’ of the plants and machines, which will impact the quantity of 
electricity generation. Third is the international working standards and safety. 
Fourth is the efficient use of resources, which concern revenues, costs and 
efficient use of assets. … The last one is quite similar to EVATM. However, 
technicians like us are not so familiar with a concept such as cost of capital, and 
we cannot control it. (Deputy Director, South Bangkok Power Plant, Generation 
Business Unit, 06/12/2010).  
There were also indications that industry-specific regulations restricted the extent to which 
UtilityCo was able to adapt the EVATM system to make it useful for performance 
management. In particular, the external regulation of electricity tariffs has an important 
influence on UtilityCo’s revenue streams and has far-reaching implications for the use of 
capital charges as a means of enhancing financial returns. These tariffs contain a variable 
element and a regulated fixed element, where the latter is based on the estimated revenue 
requirements of UtilityCo and the two retail SOEs. These estimated revenue requirements are 
fixed for the entire regulatory period and consist of two parts; one part is based on estimated 
operating costs adjusted for increases in the consumer price index minus a factor intended to 
incentivise SOEs to improve operating efficiency and the other part is based on the revenues 
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required to generate a specific return on investment (ROI).  However, the ROI rates have been 
lower than the cost of capital typically used to calculate EVATM in UtilityCo and its managers 
reportedly used this as an ‘excuse’ for negative EVATM performance. At the business unit 
level, this problem was exacerbated by the transfer prices used to determine the revenues of 
the six support units. These transfer prices were based on a formula similar to that used by the 
energy regulator to calculate estimated revenue requirements and was closely linked to the 
ROI used by the regulator. Although UtilityCo has gone beyond the SEPO’s minimum 
requirements, by using differentiated WACCs across the business units, this does not seem to 
have resolved this problem or increased the pressure on managers to improve financial 
returns. Furthermore, managers indicated that they had very little opportunity to improve 
their EVATM by managing the assets more effectively, as most asset utilisation decisions were 
subject to various forms of regulation. One of them explained: 
The Ministry of Finance wants us to improve efficiency and EVATM, but it does not 
relax regulations to enable us to do so. Now, we have a limited right to manage our 
assets. For example, although we have a lot of cash, our CFO cannot use it to invest in 
highly profitable shares. Actually, we cannot do almost anything that may be risky. 
Even for unused assets, we cannot independently sell public assets for commercial 
purposes. If we want to get rid of them to avoid the capital charge, it may be easier to 
donate them. (Chief, Corporate Planning Division, Policy and Planning Business Unit, 
21/10/2010) 
Regulatory restrictions have also discouraged UtilityCo’s senior management from 
extensively using the EVATM system to incentivise staff. Some of our interviewees pointed to 
the perceived unfairness of such practices as regulatory constraints severely circumscribe the 
controllability of financial performance. This perceived unfairness was reinforced by cultural 
characteristics arising from the professional background of the staff. Most of the staff have an 
engineering-based background, and inevitably emphasised technical rather than financial 
aspects of performance, and this reportedly reduced their appreciation of EVATM. There was 
evidence that this engineering-based mind set, coupled with the quite relaxed working 
environment and the culture of Krengjai, led to the emphasis being placed on collegial bonds 
(widely referred to as ‘brother-sister relationships’), rather than the aggressive pursuit of 
individual performance. One of our interviewees explained:   
Actually our brother-sister relationship, easy-going working style and blunt 
incentive plan are not that bad, and seem to be suitable for UtilityCo. The brother-
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sister relationship facilitates cooperation, as it reduces unnecessary official 
working processes. For example, now I can ask people in other departments to do 
some extra work for me by simply calling their supervisors. If we do not have 
these close social relationships, we might need a lot more time to go through very 
long official processes. In addition, non-competitive working environment also 
provides a good chance for smart people to show their capability with support and 
assistance from their co-workers. We do not need to waste time competing with 
each other in order to get a higher bonus. (Economist Level 10, Office of the 
Governor Business Unit, 18/08/2011) 
Given these cultural characteristics, the management of UtilityCo has refrained from going 
beyond the SEPO’s minimum requirement to link EVATM performance only to the bonuses of 
the CEO and has retained the use of bonuses based on corporate (rather than individual) 
performance for all other employees.  
To summarise, the findings from UtilityCo emphasise the crucial role played, within this 
SOE, by the ongoing adaptations of the EVATM system which emerged from the 
consultations between the SEPO and individual SOEs. The development of EVATM in 
UtilityCo largely mirrors the more general development of the system within the Thai SOE 
sector, in that the initially far-reaching plans to introduce EVATM to facilitate privatisation 
eventually gave way to less ambitious efforts to use it to increase financial returns. With the 
exception of the use of the cost of capital, UtilityCo did not go very far beyond the minimum 
requirements embedded in the evolving regulatory standards governing the use of EVATM. As 
will be explained below, however, the choices embedded in these standards have enabled 
other SOEs, with different regulatory and cultural characteristics, to place a greater emphasis 
on financial returns. 
 
4.2.3.2 BankCo 
BankCo is one of the largest commercial banks in Thailand and was fully state-owned until 
1989, when some of its shares were floated on the Thai stock exchange. In 2010, the state’s 
ownership stake was 55 per cent. From 2004, the BankCo also embarked on an ambitious 
programme of strategic re-positioning aimed at transforming itself from an allegedly 
conservative and bureaucratic state institution to a more customer-focused and commercially 
minded organisation. BankCo also began the development of a more sophisticated 
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performance management system for evaluating its sub-units. According to BankCo’s 
management, the adoption of EVATM as a compulsory governance mechanism in 2006 was 
an important extension of this system supporting its strategic re-orientation: 
We would like to thank the SEPO for their policy to implement EVATM as it acted 
like a catalyst for full implementation of a sub-unit performance measurement 
system. We started to develop the system almost four years before the policy, but 
it was not successful. We needed some kind of coercive pressures from the 
outside to facilitate the change. We were lucky that the EVATM system fits our 
management’s interests very well. (Director, Management Information Division, 
Financial Management Group, 29/09/2010) 
In addition, the EVATM system was seen to be consistent with the broader reforms within the 
financial services industry which were unfolding under the influence of international 
regulatory initiatives, such as Basel II, as they both reinforced the emphasis on systematic 
risk management. Following the steps taken by the Bank of Thailand to comply with Basel II, 
some industry-specific requirements concerning the use of performance metrics which are 
similar to EVATM were introduced between 2004 and 2009. For instance, BankCo was 
required to use a Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)8 to evaluate its lending and 
investments. Following the advice of the Bank of Thailand, BankCo incorporated this 
measure into its system for allocating risk-adjusted capital to its sub-units. This facilitated the 
use of EVATM at lower organisational levels. In contrast the difficulties of harmonising the 
calculation of EVATM with industry-specific regulations in UtilityCo, BankCo’s use of 
EVATM is much more consistent with its industry-specific regulations. BankCo applies a 
corporate-wide WACC of about 11 per cent in calculating both corporate and sub-unit 
EVATM.  On the face of it, this does not yield capital charges which reflect the different levels 
of risk in the individual sub-units. However, the use of RAROC for allocating capital to sub-
units partly compensates for this and, according to our interviewees, reinforces the awareness 
of risk-adjusted costs of capital in a way that is consistent with the use of EVATM. A manager 
directly involved in risk management remarked: 
We have been using RAROC for risk management within the bank for several 
years as it is a normal practice within the banking industry. ... For me, RAROC 
and EVATM provide the same information. The only difference is that RAROC 
                                                          
8 Defined as the ratio of risk-adjusted returns to risk-adjusted capital. 
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represents the percentage of economic profit over economic capital, while EVATM 
represents the magnitude of economic profit. (Senior Director, Risk Management 
Group, 09/11/2010) 
He continued by elaborating on the efforts made within BankCo to make the use of RAROC 
compatible with EVATM:  
Since 2008, the Bank of Thailand has required all financial institutions in 
Thailand to implement Basel II under either a standardised approach (the basic 
level) or an internal-rating based approach (the more sophisticated one). … 
Actually, we [the Risk Management Group] are using an internal-rating based 
approach in calculating RAROC. … But the EVATM team attempted to simplify 
our approach because EVATM is to be used by all divisions throughout the bank. 
Thus, the team uses the standardised approach in allocating invested capital for 
the purpose of EVATM calculation. (Senior Director, Risk Management Group, 
09/11/2010) 
These efforts to make EVATM an integral part of performance management practices seem to 
have enhanced BankCo’s employees’ acceptance of the system. In contrast to UtilityCo, there 
were few indications of resistance to the use EVATM as a means of decentralising financial 
decisions.   Even though the possibility of making such decisions on a strictly financial basis 
can occasionally be constrained by other regulatory requirements, such as the requirement to 
maintain service levels in remote rural areas, EVATM is an integral part of capital investment 
making, as one of our interviewees explained:  
We are using EVATM to support decision making in many ways. For example, we 
set the criterion that any new branch must have a positive EVATM within three 
years. … Thus, before opening a new branch, a detailed feasibility study, 
including a five-year EVATM forecast, will be evaluated. … After the branch is 
opened, we will consistently track its EVATM every six months for at least five 
years.  (Director, Management Information Division, Financial Management 
Group, 29/09/2010) 
In contrast to UtilityCo, BankCo has made far-reaching efforts to develop a responsibility 
accounting and transfer pricing system, called the Profitability System, to facilitate the 
disaggregation of EVATM. Under the Profitability System, all front-office functions were 
initially treated as profit centres, whilst middle- and back-office functions were cost centres. 
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However, this changed after the introduction of EVATM and now all functions are profit 
centres. This provided a stepping stone for the use of EVATM as a performance metric at the 
business unit9 level, as well as at the lower departmental and divisional levels within business 
units. To facilitate this arrangement and to coordinate the interdependencies between the 
various functions, a transfer pricing system was established, using so-called ‘internal service 
charges’, based on external market prices, where available, or the time spent delivering the 
services. This transfer pricing system has enabled BankCo to go considerably beyond the 
minimum requirements of the SEPO by establishing EVATM centres below the business unit 
level across the entire organisation and use the system to enhance a sense of profit 
consciousness throughout the organisation. However, consistent with the regulatory standards 
established by the SEPO, EVATM initially carried only a small weight in the performance 
agreements for the various sub-units. As noted above, BankCo was also one of the SOEs that 
objected to the SEPO’s initial use of EVATM targets aimed at continuous improvement. 
BankCo saw such targets as incompatible with the external regulation of the financial 
services industry, or as one of our interviewees explained: 
Our operations are influenced by several external factors that we cannot control. 
For instance, the Bank of Thailand just changed its regulations on fee income, and 
this strongly impacts our operations. … Interest rates are changing every day. … 
It is not appropriate for us to set EVATM targets based on performance in the 
previous year. (Senior Director, Planning and Budgeting Division, Financial 
Management Group, 24/11/2010) 
According to our interviewees, the abandonment of continuous improvement targets 
reinforced the acceptance of EVATM targets at lower levels. However, similar to many other 
SOEs, the interviewees indicated that this has tended to render targets easily achievable:    
EVATM targets based on our budgets and forecasts are easily achievable. No one 
will set too challenging targets. It is quite impossible for the Planning and 
Budgeting Division, which is responsible for monitoring budget targets, to know 
how reasonable our targets are compared to what we do. (Senior Director, Credit 
Operation Division, Operation Group, 16/08/2011)  
Nevertheless, BankCo’s management has been reluctant to relax performance pressures too 
much and has sought to reinforce the focus on EVATM at lower organisational levels through 
                                                          
9 The term ‘Group’ is typically used within BankCo for its business units.  
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its incentive system. BankCo is one of the relatively few SOEs that have gone beyond the 
SEPO’s minimum requirement and linked bonuses to EVATM below the CEO level. This was 
possible because of cultural characteristics rooted in the professional background of the 
bank’s staff. In contrast to UiltityCo, our interviewees in BankCo indicated that their 
educational background and extensive professional experience in the financial sector made it 
easier for them to understand and accept financial concepts such as EVATM. Even though 
BankCo’s bonus programme is subject to the same regulatory restrictions as other SOEs, it 
has been able to implement bonuses based on individual performance linked to EVATM down 
to the divisional level. This seems to have encountered little resistance, as one of our 
interviewees explained: 
We tried not to make staff dislike the system, especially since the beginning. … 
Thus, we started to integrate sub-unit EVATM results into the incentive system by 
incorporating it as one of the performance indicators with only 5 per cent weight. 
Then after our staff became used to EVATM and had more confidence in the 
system, the weight was increased to 10 per cent. This gradual change, along with 
the EVATM targets that are consistent with their budgets and business plans, did 
not create resistance. (Senior Executive Vice President, Financial Management 
Group and Risk Management Group, 11/01/2011)   
The acceptance of EVATM incentives has also been facilitated by the hiring of a new, younger 
generation of staff, who possess a stronger (and often international) educational background 
and often have private sector experience, as an integral part of the strategy of turning BankCo 
into a more commercially orientated organisation. Some of our interviewees suggested that 
this new generation is more accustomed to financial concepts and incentives than their older 
peers. Hence, the implementation of EVATM was not only facilitated by BankCo’s cultural 
characteristics, but also formed an integral part of the process of cultural change supporting 
its strategic re-orientation. 
To summarise, our findings show that industry-specific regulations and cultural 
characteristics, which deviate somewhat from those traditionally dominating Thai SOEs, have 
enabled BankCo to take advantage of the choices embedded in the regulatory standards for 
EVATM to support its process of strategic re-orientation. As explained below, these efforts to 
adapt EVATM and go considerably beyond the SEPO’s minimum requirements have 
continued despite unfolding governance reforms which have effectively relaxed the 
regulatory pressures on Thai SOEs to use EVATM for performance management. 
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4.3 Adaptation of EVATM to the State Enterprise Performance Appraisal System 
(2010-2012) 
4.3.1 Unfolding reform context and supply-side adaptations 
Since 2010, EVATM has undergone further adaptations as the SEPO has gradually replaced 
the SEPES with a new performance management system – the State Enterprise Performance 
Appraisal System (SEPAS). Similar to the initial introduction of EVATM, this meant that the 
system had to be adapted to yet another reform programme inspired by a rather different 
innovation. The SEPAS drew heavily on well-established Total Quality Management (TQM) 
practices, such as the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award (MBNQA), which had 
begun to diffuse to private sector companies in Thailand in the early 2000s (Wipulanusat et 
al., 2015). Following the demise of the Shinawatra government, the MBNQA was also 
adopted as a way of improving the managerial processes within public sector organisations 
(Sutheewasinnon et al., 2016). Although the SEPO had little direct influence on this broader 
reform programme, it started to align its performance management practices with this 
programme. In 2010, the SEPAS was officially introduced as a compulsory standard for 
SOEs. At the time of our study, the SEPAS was being implemented in five SOEs (including 
UtilityCo) and it has since been more or less fully applied by all SOEs (Wipulanusat et al., 
2015). 
Similar to most TQM practices, the performance management ethos embedded in the SEPAS 
has a strong process focus, which has often been seen as antithetical to results-orientated 
innovations such as the Balanced Scorecard and EVATM (see Modell, 2009). The system 
relies more heavily on organisational self-assessment of improvements in operating processes 
and managerial decision-making than on the quantifiable performance targets established by 
the SEPO. However, the SEPO never intended the SEPAS to replace the use of EVATM. One 
SEPO official explained: 
Now we have shifted our focus from the EVATM project to the SEPAS. We will not 
abandon the EVATM system. However, we think that the SEPAS can address some 
weaknesses in the existing system. In addition, we believe that SOEs are now familiar 
with the EVATM system. The six years that we spent on developing EVATM should be 
enough. The next step in EVATM is integrating it into the SEPAS. SOEs can choose 
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how they want to utilise the EVATM system to achieve their missions. (Head of SOE 
Performance Evaluation Division, the SEPO, 11/10/2010) 
As this quote suggests, an important ambition behind the SEPAS was to imbue regulatory 
standards with a greater degree of choice on the part of SOEs. As explained below, this has 
had important implications for the continued development of EVATM in the Thai SOE sector. 
 
4.3.2 Adaptations of regulatory standards 
Insofar as EVATM is concerned, the most significant changes in regulatory standards 
pertained to the weight given to EVATM in the performance agreements and to the way the 
SEPO assesses whether SOEs have met EVATM targets. Following the introduction of the 
SEPAS, SOEs no longer have to give any specific weight to EVATM, although they are still 
required to use EVATM at lower organisational levels, and the SEPO has shifted its emphasis 
towards more qualitative evaluations of SOEs work on developing their EVATM system. 
Although these changes are partly attributable to the broader reform programme unfolding in 
the Thai public sector, they were also influenced by the continued complaints about the 
problems experienced by many SOEs in using EVATM at lower organisational levels. 
Summarising the way the process-orientated performance management practices embedded 
in the SEPAS could alleviate these problems and facilitate the use of EVATM, one SEPO 
official explained: 
I think that the key benefits from implementing EVATM come from the learning 
process rather than the EVATM numbers. For example, improved analytical skills as 
well as slight changes in mind set are more useful, and they are more under control of 
the staff than their final quantitative results. (Head of SOE Performance Evaluation 
Division, the SEPO, 11/10/2010) 
Moreover, some of our interviewees indicated that the transition from a results-orientated to a 
process-orientated approach to performance evaluation was more consistent with the cultural 
characteristics of many SOEs, as the latter approach effectively reduces performance 
pressures on staff. However, following the SEPO’s ambition to grant SOEs a greater degree 
of choice in complying with regulatory standards, individual SOEs are still allowed to retain 
elements of a results-orientated approach in their internal performance management practices. 
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As explained below, this has enabled SOEs to continue to adapt the EVATM system to their 
specific needs. 
 
4.3.3 Organisation-specific adaptations among regulatees 
4.3.3.1 UtilityCo 
UtilityCo was one of the SOEs that influenced the SEPO’s decision to implement the SEPAS, 
as it continued to raise concerns about the problems of using EVATM at lower organisational 
levels. These concerns were highlighted in 2009 when the SEPO initiated a project in 
UtilityCo to resolve problems related to its transfer pricing system. Although this project did 
not produce any significant changes in transfer pricing practices, it alerted the SEPO to the 
risk that collaboration between operating units could be jeopardised if too much emphasis 
was placed on EVATM results. In 2011, UtilityCo was selected as one of the first SOEs to 
implement the SEPAS and it has since been evaluated in accordance with the regulatory 
standards laid down in this system. The process-orientated approach to performance 
management has also been implemented throughout the organisation. According to our 
interviewees, this has effectively eliminated much of the emphasis placed on EVATM at lower 
organisational levels. EVATM targets are only used for evaluating the performance of the 
CEO. However, it was suggested that the CEO had tried to exert even stronger influence on 
regulatory standards by requesting that EVATM should be removed from UtilityCo’s 
performance agreement. Hence, insofar as EVATM is concerned, UtilityCo has continued to 
comply only with the minimum requirements laid down in the SEPO’s regulatory standards. 
Several of our interviewees expressed their satisfaction with this approach and claimed that 
the reduced emphasis on EVATM was more consistent with the engineering-based mind set 
that has long permeated UtilityCo. 
 
4.3.3.2 BankCo 
In contrast to UtilityCo, BankCo’s management lamented the changes in regulatory standards 
and they expressed concern that the shift towards a process-orientated approach to 
performance management was likely to reduce the impetus behind their efforts to use EVATM 
to support the bank’s strategic re-orientation. One of our interviewees explained: 
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I do not understand why the SEPO moves away from an advanced management 
innovation like EVATM, back to the broad and old fashioned concepts of the SEPAS. 
In addition, I think that the EVATM system can be improved a lot more than now if the 
SEPO continues to push the EVATM project. … Therefore, I think it is too soon to 
introduce new concepts like the SEPAS, and this will lessen resources and efforts that 
could be spent on improving the EVATM system. (Senior Executive Vice President, 
Financial Management Group and Risk Management Group, BankCo, 11/01/2011) 
However, BankCo has taken advantage of the choices embedded in the SEPAS and the new 
regulatory standards have not restricted its pursuit of a more results-orientated approach to 
performance management at lower organisational levels. In 2011, the use of EVATM was 
extended to specific products and customers in order to reinforce the focus on the returns 
generated by different customer segments. Since the appointment of a new CEO in 2012, 
BankCo has used EVATM more aggressively for target-setting and incentivisation. The new 
CEO was dissatisfied with BankCo’s financial performance and replaced the use of budget-
based EVATM targets, for determining the size of the bonus pool, with targets based on the 
previous year’s performance and benchmarks derived from comparisons with other banks. 
This has enhanced the pressures on staff to increase year-on-year returns. The CEO also 
increased the weight attached to EVATM in the bonus plans for managers at lower 
organisational levels, and started to widen the pay gap between high-performing and low-
performing managers and also to differentiate the EVATM targets and bonuses used for 
managers with more or less challenging jobs. These changes were combined with further 
efforts to hire younger managers with private sector experience in order to reduce cultural 
barriers to change. Our interviews in 2014 and 2016 indicated that the emphasis on EVATM 
had persisted. Thus, the changes in regulatory standards evolving under the SEPAS seem to 
have imposed relatively few restrictions on BankCo’s ability to adapt the EVATM system to 
its organisation-specific needs. 
 
5. Concluding Discussion 
This paper has responded to recent calls for more research into how MAIs interact with 
regulatory processes (Modell, 2012b, 2014; Van der Stede, 2011; Wagenhofer, 2016) by 
studying how regulators mediate the adaptation of such innovations and how this mediation 
affects their use across the different regulatees. Using a framework derived from sociological 
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research, which sees regulation as an evolving and collaborative process, we have examined 
how a ‘global’ innovation, namely EVATM, has been adapted to the regulatory environment 
of Thai SOEs. Various regulators, such as the Ministry of Finance and the SEPO, played an 
important mediating role in this process and were able to both influence the supply of EVATM 
at an early stage of its diffusion and then adapt the regulatory standards governing its use in 
response to the concerns and experiences emerging from individual SOEs. This enabled the 
regulatees to have a considerable influence on the regulatory standards throughout the 
diffusion process and contributed to imbuing those standards with a mix of choices and 
restrictions, which facilitated the further adaptation of EVATM to their organisation-specific 
needs. These observations are consistent with the literature on regulation informing this 
study, which suggests that a collaborative approach to regulation facilitates compliance with 
regulatory standards (e.g., Bozanic et al., 2012; Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Djelic and 
Sahlin, 2009). However, our findings also extend this literature in two distinct, yet inter-
related, ways.  
First, our findings show that regulatory standards do not necessarily evolve as an integral part 
of one coherent reform programme. Even though the diffusion of MAIs can be seen as an 
essential part of broader neo-liberal reform programmes aimed at ‘modernising’ the public 
sector (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and Wright, 2004), we show that the standards 
governing EVATM emerged in response to a range of more specific and partly competing 
programmes centred on diverse innovations. The mediating role of the Ministry of Finance 
and the SEPO was intimately tied up with a process where EVATM had to be adapted to other 
‘global’ innovations, such as the Balanced Scorecard and ultimately TQM, to persist in Thai 
SOEs. This insight resonates with prior research on MAIs, showing that innovations can 
influence each other and form intricate hybrids (Ax and Bjørnenak, 2005; Modell, 2009), but 
it has been largely overlooked in the broader literature on regulation informing this paper. 
Whilst recognising the programmatic nature of regulation (Braithwaite, 2008; Djelic and 
Sahlin, 2009; Levi-Faure, 2005) and the multiplicity of standards governing specific 
innovations (Djelic and den Hond, 2014; Rasche, 2010; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010), 
little attention has been paid to how particular regulatory standards are influenced by diverse 
reform programmes underpinning the supply of management innovations. Extending research 
on regulation to investigate such supply-side dynamics is important for enhancing our 
understanding of how multiple, ‘global’ innovations compete for attention and affect the 
regulatory standards which, in turn, condition the scope for context-specific adaptations.  
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Second, our view of MAIs as embedded in more or less competing reform programmes draws 
attention to the need to revise the conception of the state actors involved in regulatory 
processes. In the Thai SOE sector, the initial need for adaptations was reinforced by the fact 
that the reform programmes, centred on EVATM and the Balanced Scorecard, were endorsed 
by two state actors (i.e., Prime Minister Shinawatra and the Ministry of Finance) with slightly 
diverging interests. This contrasts with the literature on regulation informing this paper, 
which has mainly tended to distinguish between state and non-state actors without 
recognising that the former may be made up of multiple actors endorsing diverse reform 
programmes (e.g., Djelic, 2011; Djelic and Sahlin, 2009; Rasche, 2010; Timmermans and 
Epstein, 2010). This tendency to conceive of state actors as relatively monolithic entities is 
possibly due to the ambition to move away from a view of the nation state as the primary 
source of regulatory powers and the heavy emphasis on standardisation as a voluntary 
process (see Timmermans and Epstein, 2010).  However, our findings underline the need to 
revise this view of state actors to better account for the diverse political agendas that buttress 
the reform programmes, which affect regulatory standards, and to advance a more fine-
grained understanding of which interests come to influence the diffusion and regulation of 
particular innovations.   
Turning now to the literature on the diffusion and adaptation of MAIs, our findings make an 
important contribution by providing detailed insights into how regulatees can influence the 
evolution of regulatory standards and how this imbues such standards with considerable 
flexibility. Although similar observations have been made in relation to other forms of 
accounting standards (e.g., Alon and Dwyer, 2016; Bozanic et al., 2012; Mehrpouya and 
Samiolo, 2016), the literature on MAIs has been dominated by a view of regulatees as 
relatively passive recipients who have few opportunities to influence the regulatory standards 
governing such innovations (e.g., Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2003; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; 
Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and Wright, 2004; Malmi, 1999). Not even where the 
mediating role of regulators has been a key focal point (Hopper and Major, 2007; Modell et 
al., 2007) have researchers extended the analysis to examine how such mediation is affected 
by the active involvement of regulatees in the standard-setting process. By contrast, our 
findings show that close consultation between the regulators and the regulatees throughout 
the diffusion of EVATM enabled the latter to exercise considerable influence over the mix of 
choices and restrictions embedded in the evolving regulatory standards.  
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These findings suggest a need to re-think how MAIs, which are implicated in regulatory 
processes, evolve as they diffuse across organisations. In particular, they remind us that the 
flexibility of MAIs is not exclusively due to their suppliers who skilfully adapt their 
innovations to fit particular populations of organisations (see e.g., Ax and Bjørnenak, 2005, 
2007) and/or to the regulators who undertake further adaptations at an early stage of the 
diffusion process (see e.g., Chang, 2009; Suuthewasinnon et al., 2016). Closer attention to 
how regulators and, not least, regulatees influence the specific attributes of MAIs throughout 
the diffusion process can help to unpack the ways in which innovations evolve over time. 
This has important implications for large-scale diffusion studies which have traditionally 
linked the ability of organisations to adapt innovations to whether they are early or late 
adopters (e.g., Ansari et al., 2010; Malmi, 1999; Strang and Soule, 1998; Westphal et al. 
1997). The logic behind this traditional view of adaptation is that early adopters have greater 
opportunities to influence innovations, whilst later adopters tend to be faced with highly 
standardised and less malleable versions of the innovations. By contrast, our findings suggest 
that we should conceive of adaptation as an ongoing phenomenon which regulators and 
regulatees can continue to influence over time. We thus urge future studies of the diffusion of 
MAIs, which are implicated in regulatory processes, to at least complement the traditional 
distinction between early and late adopters with an analysis of whether and how individual 
adopters (regulatees) interact with the regulators and how this affects the adaptation of the 
innovations at various stages of the diffusion process.  
In contrast to prior research, which explores the mediating role of regulators (Hopper and 
Major, 2007; Modell et al., 2007), we also draw attention to two contextual factors which can 
condition the ability of regulatees to adapt MAIs and give rise to variations in their use. The 
first factor concerns the influence of industry-specific regulations on the ability of regulatees 
to take advantage of the flexibility resulting from the regulators’ mediation. Whilst both 
UtilityCo and BankCo were involved in the ongoing consultations with the SEPO, the 
industry-specific regulations surrounding electricity production compelled UtilityCo to 
comply mainly with the SEPO’s minimum requirements concerning the use of EVATM. In 
contrast, as BankCo experienced fewer difficulties in reconciling EVATM with the regulations 
governing the financial services industry, it was able to use EVATM more extensively to 
support its strategic re-orientation. These findings respond to recent calls for greater attention 
to be paid to the way in which industry differences can affect management accounting 
practices (Messner, 2016). Whilst Messner (2016) called for more comparative research into 
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the relative impact of specific types of regulation across different industries, we show that 
industry-specific regulations can also exercise a strong influence on individual regulatees and 
that this conditions their ability to comply with regulatory standards which are common 
across industries. This raises the question of what regulators of MAIs need to do to facilitate 
compliance with regulatory standards across a broad range of industries. Consistent with the 
broader, sociological literature informing this paper (see Timmermans and Epstein, 2010), 
our findings suggest that this requires the standards to be imbued with considerable 
flexibility. In the Thai SOE sector, this was facilitated by the regulators’ endorsement of 
reform programmes that deviated somewhat from the relatively forceful application of 
EVATM pursued by Prime Minister Shinawatra and their sensitivity to the needs of the 
regulatees. However, there may be situations where regulators have strong vested interests in 
particular reform programmes and therefore force regulatees to comply with more rigid 
standards. Whilst this is reminiscent of the view of regulation as a matter of unilateral 
imposition of regulatory standards, which has long prevailed in research on the diffusion of 
MAIs (e.g., Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and Wright, 
2004; Malmi, 1999), further research is required into how this affects the efficacy of 
regulation across different industries. For instance, future research could explore whether the 
use of more rigid regulation of MAIs is more or less suitable across different industries, 
depending on how they relate to industry-specific regulations. It would also be worthwhile to 
examine whether industry-specific conditions make regulatees more or less powerful vis-à-
vis the regulators and how this affects their ability to influence the regulatory standards that 
govern MAIs. Finally, further, comparative research is required across settings where the 
regulation of MAIs is characterised by varying degrees of flexibility to assess how variations 
in regulation affect the propensity for compliance.  
Turning to the second contextual factor to which we want to draw attention, our case studies 
in UtilityCo and BankCo illustrate how the efforts of regulators to adapt MAIs to the general 
cultural characteristics, which prevail within particular populations of organisations, interact 
with more organisation-specific cultures. Although the SEPO recognised the need to adapt 
EVATM to the cultural characteristics of Thai society, especially those encapsulated in the 
notion of Krengjai, organisation-specific cultural characteristics also shaped the possibilities 
for further adaptation. Whereas UtilityCo experienced significant difficulties in reconciling 
EVATM with the work-related values of its employees, BankCo experienced fewer problems 
in this regard and, furthermore, was able to use EVATM to change employee mind sets in line 
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with its changing strategic priorities. These findings are similar to those of Canato et al. 
(2013), who showed that prolonged compulsory use of management innovations can 
contribute to a change in organisational cultures. However, the differences between UtilityCo 
and BankCo point to the need to examine how other organisation-specific factors, such as the 
pursuit of different organisational strategies, can influence the way in which managers exploit 
the compulsory use of specific innovations to shape organisational cultures. These findings 
extend prior research on the diffusion of MAIs, which has mainly examined how cultural 
characteristics influence the adoption of such innovations (Ax and Greve, 2017; Baird et al., 
2004), by showing that the introduction of innovations can lead to changes in organisational 
cultures. Furthermore, our observations suggest that managers’ use of MAIs to effect cultural 
change can be reinforced or weakened by the organisational strategies being pursued. 
Exploring such broader change dynamics could extend research on how MAIs are implicated 
in the shaping of organisational cultures. Our findings also point to the need for regulators to 
be sensitive to how different organisational cultures and strategies influence the way MAIs 
are used to comply with regulatory standards.   
Taken together, the above discussion emphasises that the diffusion and adaptation of MAIs 
are implicated in a complex interplay with the regulatory standards that evolve within 
particular societal sectors and across different industries. This study has shed light on these 
relationships by drawing attention to how regulators mediate the adaptation of MAIs and how 
regulatees can influence the regulatory standards that govern such innovations. However, as 
indicated above, there are ample opportunities to extend the research in various directions. 
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Phases in the 
development of EVATM 
Introduction of EVATM Compulsory use and 
further adaptations of 
EVATM 
Adaptation of EVATM 
to the SEPAS 
Time period 2001-2006 2006-2010 2010-2012 
 
Reform context 2001: Election of 
Thaksin Shinawatra as 
Prime Minister. 
 
2002: Stern Stewart 
invited to Thailand.  
 
2003-2005: Feasibility 
study and pilot projects 
for EVATM 
commissioned by the 
SEPO. 
 
2006: EVATM adoption 
compulsory for the 
majority of SOEs. 
 
2006: Ousting of the 
Shinawatra government. 
 
2006-2009: The SEPO 
working closely with 
individual SOEs to 
implement and develop 
the EVATM system. 
2010: Introduction of the 
SEPAS. 
 
2011-2012: The SEPAS 
gradually adopted and 
implemented in 
individual SOEs. 
Supply-side adaptations  EVATM reconciled with 
the SEPES and the 
Balanced Scorecard 
instead of serving as a 
stand-alone system. 
 
N/A. Strong influence from 
the MBNQA on the 
SEPAS.  
Adaptations of 
regulatory standards 
EVATM integrated into 
extant performance 
agreements. 
 
Capital charges adapted 
to Thai capital markets 
conditions. 
 
Incentives linked to 
EVATM adapted to extant 
regulation of bonuses. 
 
 
Reduced weight of 
EVATM in performance 
agreements.  
 
Reduced pressures to 
create independent 
EVATM centres. 
 
Abandonment of 
continuous improvement 
targets linked to EVATM. 
 
 
No specific weight 
attached to EVATM in 
performance agreements.  
  
Reduced emphasis on 
EVATM results for 
performance evaluation. 
Organisation-specific 
adaptations among 
regulatees. 
 
N/A. UtilityCo: 
Initially aiming at 
extensive 
implementation of 
EVATM in anticipation of 
privatisation. Gradually 
reducing these ambitions 
and extensively involved 
in influencing evolving 
regulatory standards. 
 
UtilityCo: 
Continuing to influence 
regulatory standards and 
adopting the SEPAS at an 
early stage. Complying 
with the SEPO’s minimum 
requirements for the use of 
EVATM. 
BankCo: 
Going beyond the 
minimum regulatory 
requirements, due to 
consistency between 
EVATM and industry-
specific regulations and 
cultural characteristics. 
BankCo: 
Continuing to go beyond 
minimum regulatory 
requirements and attaching 
increasing weight to 
EVATM in performance 
agreements and incentive 
plans. 
 
 
Table 1. The development of EVATM in the Thai SOE sector. 
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Appendix: Lists of Interviewees 
Table A1. Interviews with suppliers, regulators and SOEs not included as case studies. 
Interviewee 
Duration 
(min.) 
Date 
2010 2011 2012 2014 2016 
Senior Executive and Fiscal Advisor, the MOF (responsible 
for overseeing SEPO) 
120 12/10   
  
Deputy Director, SEPO 60 10/11 
 
   
Head of SOE Performance Evaluation Division, SOE 
Performance Management and Evaluation Bureau, SEPO 
85 14/09   
  
40 11/10     
85  02/08    
35   12/05   
45    11/12  
15*     30/6 
Fiscal Analyst (Professional Level), SOE Performance 
Management and Evaluation Bureau, SEPO 
60 11/10 
 
 
  
Analyst, SOE Performance Management and Evaluation 
Bureau, SEPO 
30*  22/08 
 
  
Fiscal Analyst (Professional Level), Policy and Planning 
Bureau, SEPO 
60  16/09 
 
  
Account Officer, State Securities Management  Bureau, 
SEPO 
30*  16/09  
  
Vice Director, 
Senior Analyst, 
Analyst, 
 Thai Rating and Information Services Co., Ltd. (TRIS)  
60  17/01 
 
  
Chairman, Stern Stewart  Thailand (SST) 60 07/10     
Ex-Country Manager, SST 45 29/12     
Ex-Associate Consultant, SST 40  27/12    
Head, 
Analyst,  
 Business Planning Department, Corporate Business 
Unit, PTT  
120 29/09  
 
  
Vice President, Business Planning Department, Gas 
Business Unit, PTT   
45* 09/11   
  
Vice President, Business Planning Department, Oil 
Business Unit, PTT   
80 19/11  
 
  
Analyst, Business Planning Department, Oil Business Unit, 
PTT  
60 19/11  
 
  
Senior Analyst, Research and Development Department, 
Corporate Business Unit, PTT  
90 24/12  
 
  
Planner, Strategic Planning Department 
Analyst, Finance and Accounting Group, 
 PTT Exploration and Production Public Company 
50 01/12   
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Limited 
Ex-Vice Director, Port Authority of Thailand 30 22/11     
 
Director, Policy and Planning Division, Port Authority of 
Thailand 
95 11/11   
  
Senior Analyst, Policy and Planning Division, Port 
Authority of Thailand 
75 23/11   
  
Director, Office of Accounting, Port Authority of Thailand 100 26/11     
Total number of interviews  17 6 1 1 1 
* Interviews were not recorded. 
 
Table A2. Interviews in UtilityCo. 
Interviewee 
Duration 
(min.) 
Date 
2010 2011 2012  2014    2016 
Deputy Governor (the Chairman of the EVA committee), 
Policy and Planning BU 
60 09/12   
  
Assistant Governor, Policy and Panning BU 60 02/11     
Assistant Director, 
Chief, 
  Portfolio Management Division, Policy and Planning 
BU 
181 22/09   
  
 90  22/07    
Chief, Corporate Planning Division, Policy and Planning 
BU 
90 21/10   
  
Assistant Director, Energy Economics Division, Policy and 
Planning BU 
50  09/09  
  
Deputy Governor, Accounting and Finance BU 
 
60 08/12   
  
 
Assistant Governor, Accounting and Finance BU 175  26/08    
 
Director, Controller Division, Accounting and Finance BU 
130 15/10   
  
120  13/09    
90   09/01   
60    11/12  
30     01/07 
Accountant level 10, Generation Area Accounting and 
Budget Division, Accounting and Finance BU 
81 08/10     
30  13/12    
 
Chief Accountant, South Bangkok Power Plant Accounting 
and Finance Section, Generation Area Accounting and 
Budget Division, Accounting and Finance BU 
100 17/11   
  
 
Accountant level 10, Transmission Area Accounting and 
Budget Division, Accounting and Finance BU 
67  07/09  
  
 
90  09/09    
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Chief Accountant level 10, 
 Development Area Accounting and Budget Division, 
Accounting and Finance BU 
30*    
 09/06 
Accountant level 10, Corporate Office Area Accounting 
and Budget Division, Accounting and Finance BU 
50  07/09  
  
Engineer level 11, Development BU 
Engineer level 10, Transmission BU 
120 02/11   
  
Assistant Governor, 
Architect Level 10,  
 Fuel BU 
120  23/08  
  
Chief, Human Resources Division, Administration BU 
50  09/09    
30  13/12    
Economist level 10, Office of the Governor BU 
120  18/08    
90  13/12    
Chief, Power Generation Agreement Section, Planning and 
Quality Development Division, Generation BU 
120  17/08  
  
Chief, Generation Area Planning and Evaluation Section, 
Planning and Quality Development Division, 
Generation BU 
95 01/11   
  
 
Deputy Director, 
Chief  (Maintenance Unit), 
Supervisor (Generating Unit), 
Staff, 
 South Bangkok Power Plant, Generation BU 
152 16/12   
  
Total number of interviews  11 14 1 1 2 
 
Table A3. Interviews in BankCo. 
Interviewee 
Duration 
(min.) 
Date 
2010 2011 2012 2014  2016 
President 30  20/12    
Senior Executive Vice President, Financial Management 
Group and Risk Management Group 
40  11/01  
  
Executive Vice President, Financial Management Group  
93 17/09     
60  14/07    
Senior Director, Planning and Budgeting Division,  
Financial Management Group 
60 24/11   
  
Director, Management Information Division, Financial 
Management Group 
150 29/09     
130  21/07    
60   10/01   
40    12/12  
60     15/06 
Chief, 
Senior Staff, 
Junior Staff, 
180  28/07  
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 Management Information Division, Financial 
Management Group 
Executive Vice President, Government & State Enterprise 
Relations Group 
60* 08/11   
  
Assistant Director, Government Office Relation Division, 
Government & State Enterprise Relations Group  
90  11/09  
  
Director, 
Vice Director,  
 Credit Restructuring and Asset Management Group 
50 12/11   
  
Executive Vice President, Banking Operation Department, 
Operation Group 
40 24/11   
  
Senior Director , Risk Management Group 50 09/11     
Senior Executive Vice President , Electronic Banking and 
Cash Management Group 
50*  03/08  
  
Senior Director , Medium Business 1 Division, Business 
Centre Group 
65  18/07  
  
Director, Credit Risk Transaction Management-Central 
Region Division, Credit Risk Transaction Management 
Group 
80  18/07  
  
 
Senior Director, Legal Support & Loan Collection 
Expedition Division, Compliance and Legal 
Management Group  
60  29/08  
  
 
Senior Director, 
Staff,  
 Credit Operation Division, Operation Group 
120  16/08  
  
Executive Vice President, Human Resources & Corporate 
Governance Group 
40 12/11   
  
Assistant Director, Staff Employment Division, Human 
Resources & Corporate Governance Group 
   09/01 
  
Assistant Director , Staff Development & Training 
Division, Human Resources & Corporate Governance 
Group 
30*  23/08  
  
Staff, Staff Development & Training Division, Human 
Resources & Corporate Governance Group 
45  23/08  
  
Senior Director, Corporate Banking 1 Division, Corporate 
Banking 1 Group 
50 12/11   
  
Senior Director, Industrial Finance 1 Division, Corporate 
Banking 2 Group 
60  29/08  
  
Executive Vice President, Network & Retail Banking 
Products Strategy Department, Retail Business and 
Network Group 
82 09/11   
  
Senior Director, Metropolitan Network Region 1 
Department, Retail Business and Network Group 
50 08/11   
  
Director, Sub-Regional Office 1, Metropolitan Network 
Region 1 Department, Retail Business and Network 
Group 
90   06/01 
  
Branch Manager 1, Metropolitan Network Region 1 
Department, Retail Business and Network Group 
94 19/11   
  
Branch Manager 2, Metropolitan Network Region 1 83 09/12     
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Department, Retail Business and Network Group 
Total number of interviews  13 14 3 1 1 
* Interviews were not recorded
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